[과학철학] Cartwright (1989), Ch 5 “Abstract and Concrete” 요약 정리 (미완성)

     

[ Nancy Cartwright (1989), Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 183-230. ]

 

 

  5.1. Introduction

  5.2. Idealization and the Need for Capacities

  5.3. Abstractions Versus Symbolic Representations

  5.4. What Do Abstract Laws Say?

    5.4.1. Semantics for Generics and Habituals

    5.4.2. Abstraction and Concretization

    5.4.3. Material Abstraction

  5.5. Concreteness and Causal Structure

  5.6. Conclusion

 

 

  5.1. Introduction

 

p.183 #1

- For John Stuart Mill

(i) the basic laws of economics are laws about enduring ‘tendencies’ and not just about the sequence of events, and 

(ii) the laws of economics are ‘abstract’.

- the use of ‘abstract’ points, not to the content of the laws, but rather to the methods that must involve an element of the a priori.

- How could one establish a law about capacities by pure induction?

p.183 #2

- the problems about that force one to use a mixed method in ‘going upwards’ from experience to general principle

- First Mill argues that route downwards involves adding(?) corrections to allow for the effects of the disturbing causes.

p.184 #1

- Capacities cannot be so readily decoupled from this notion of abstraction, since the converse processes of abstraction and concretization have no content unless a rich ontology of competing capacities and disturbances is presupposed.

p.184 #2

- Secondary Mill concerns the source of our information about the disturbing causes for any given case.

- The fact that a great many of the disturbing cases fall outside the domain of the science in question means there is never any recipe for how to get from the abstract to any of the concrete system it is supposed to treat.

- the problem of material abstraction

p.185 #1

- Cartwright’s central thesis is that modern science works by abstraction; and her central worry is that philosophers have no good account of how.

- In many cases that abstractions can be taken as claims about capacities; and this thesis supports the reality of capacities.

- It has implications that, where abstraction reigns, laws have no fundamental role to play on scientific theory.

 

  5.2. Idealization and the Need for Capacities

p.185 #2

The problem which dr ~

p.186  Mcmullin himself 다음

He urges that 

the tenden~~

p,186 #1

맥멀린의 해결책에 인식론적 문제

p.186 #2

이상화와 추상화를 구분해야 함

p.187 #1

이상화: 구체 -> 추상

p.187 #2

함수를 추상화한 법칙은 이상화된 법칙과 다르다.

p.188 #1

미시물리학의 법칙은 극도로 추상적

그래서 인과역량이 필요 (왜?)

p.188 #2

(i) idealization과 abstraction은 다르다.

(ii) abstraction이 가능하지 않으면 idealization은 쓸모없다.

Galilean idealization은 경향이나 인과역량을 전제함

(1) 

(2) Is the ideal ~

(3) What difference ~

p.189 #1

Funkenstein의 논변

: 중세에는 counterfactual state가 factual state와 commensible 하지 않음

갈릴레오는 분리하여 commensible 

p.190 #1

Why do we think what happens in those circumstances ~ ?

p.190 #2

이유: 이러한 논리는 인과역량의 논리다.

p.191 #1

갈릴레이식 이상화는 카트라이트와는 맞고, 근대 과학과도 맞는다.

이는 흄과 상반된다.

  5.3. Abstractions Versus Symbolic Representations

p.191 #2

이상화와 추상화는 연결되지만 차이점이 있다.

(1) 모형 안에서 참이다

(2) 추상 법칙 자체가 참이다.

p.192 #1

구체적인 것을 기술하지 않는 법칙은 인과역량을 기술하는 것이다.

두 가지 abstraction을 구분해야 한다.

(1)은 인과역량에 대한 깔끔한 해결책

(2)는 뒤엠에서 찾을 수 있음

p.192 #2

뒤엠은 물리학의 법칙이 추상적인 것이 실재론에 위협이 된다고 봄.

반실재론자는 아니고 개념을 구분

p.193 #1

뒤엠: a theoretical fact는 concrete facts에 대응함

p.193 #2

the abstractness of the object 

source

(i) wholism

(ii) to represent reality

문제: mismatch

p.194 #1

뒤엠: 물리학의 수학적 개념을 precise but 실재는 그렇게 드러나지 않는다.

 

 

  5.4. What Do Abstract Laws Say?

    5.4.1. Semantics for Generics and Habituals

    5.4.2. Abstraction and Concretization

    5.4.3. Material Abstraction

  5.5. Concreteness and Causal Structure

  5.6. Conclusion

 

 

(2016.02.19.)