- 과목명: <과학철학 과제연구: 과학과 가치>
- 서울대 과학학과 대학원
- 2023년 1학기
- 담당 교수: 천현득
※ 본 수업은 인문대학 철학과에서 개설하는 “과학철학연구”와 자연과학대학 과학학과에서 개설하는 “과학철학 과제연구”와의 합반 수업으로, 수강생은 하나의 교과목에만 수강신청을 할 수 있다.
■ 수업 개요 및 목표
• 이번 학기 세미나 수업은 “과학과 가치(science and values)”를 주제로 한다.
• 과학과 가치의 관계는 무엇인가? 과학에 가치의 역할이 있을까? 과거 많은 과학자들과 철학자들은 과학의 가치중립성(value-free ideal)을 옹호하면서, 가치의 개입은 과학의 객관성을 침해한다고 간주했다. 그러나 다양한 종류의 가치가 실험 설계, 목표 설정, 방법론 선택, 이론 평가 등 과학 활동의 여러 국면에서 영향을 미친다는 주장도 지속적으로 제기되었다. 이를 인정할 수밖에 없다면, 과학-내적인 인식적 가치의 영향을 허용하면서도, 비인식적 가치의 영향은 과학을 타락시킨다고 주장할 수 있을까? 아니면 비인식적 가치도 적절하게 과학에서 사용될 수 있을까? 이번 세미나에서 우리는 과학에서 가치의 역할을 논의하는 고전적이고 현대적인 문헌들 가운데 일부를 다룬다.
■ 참고문헌
• Kitcher, Philip. 2001. Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Longino, Helen E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, Princeton U Press.
• Longino, Helen E. 2002. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Douglas, Heather E. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press.
• Lacey, Hugh. 1999. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding. London: Routledge.
• Putnam, Hilary. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other essays. Harvard University Press.
• Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters (ed.) 2005. Science, Values, and Objectivity, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
• Kourany, Janet. 2010. Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kevin Elliott and Daniel Steel (ed.) 2017. Current Controversies in Values and Science, Routledge.
• Elliott, Kevin. 2017. A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. OUP.
■ 성적 평가: 출석 및 참여도, 발제 및 비평문, 기말논문
• 1) 모든 수강생은 매 수업에 성실하게 참여할 것이 요구된다. 주어진 문헌을 미리 읽어오고 수업 중 토론에 참여한다.
• 2) 발제자는 핵심 내용을 논증적으로 재구성하는 방식으로 요약하고, 이를 비판적으로 검토한다. 비판적 검토란 주요 주장에 대한 가능한 반론, 숨겨진 전제, 저자가 제시하지 않은 지지 논증, 저자의 주장이 가진 추가적인 함의 등을 포함한다. 발제문은 수업시간 24시간 전까지 제출한다. (게시판 이용)
• 3) 기말논문은 6월 16일(금)까지 제출하고, 기한 내 제출된 논문은 간략한 논평과 함께 반환한다. 기한을 넘겨 제출하는 경우 늦은 만큼 감점될 수 있고 논평을 받지 못할 수 있다.
• 기말논문 작성 시 확인사항:
(1) 논문에서 다루려는 철학적 문제는 세부적이고 분명한가?
(2) 핵심 주장과 논제는 명료하게 진술되었는가?
(3) 그를 뒷받침할 논증은 구체적이고 타당한가? (단순하면서도 생생한 사례가 사용되었는가?)
(4) 논증에 대한 가능한 반론들을 고려했는가?
(5) 불필요한 전문용어(jargon)나 불분명한 어휘들이 사용되지 않았는가?
(6) 퇴고 과정은 거쳤는가?
■ Honor Code:
• 본 과목을 수강하는 학생들은 양심과 책임의식에 기반하며 시험, 과제물 및 보고서 작성시 학문의 정직성을 훼손하지 않겠다는 서약을 한 것으로 간주한다.
■ Schedule and Readings
(아래 일정은 잠정적이며, 각 주의 읽기 자료도 변경될 수 있다.)
Week 1. (3/2) Introduction
• Kourany, Chapter 2. The Legacy of 20c Philosophy of Science (pp.21-41)
• Elliott, K. 2017. A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1. (pp.1-17)
Week 2. (3/9) Setting the Stage: The Classical Debate
• Rudner, Richard. 1953. The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20(1), 1-6.
• Richard C. Jeffrey. 1956. Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses. Philosophy of Science, 23(3), 237-246.
• Levi, Isaac. 1960. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?, The Journal of Philosophy, 57(11), pp. 345-357.
• [opt] Hempel, Carl G. 1965. Science and Human Values. In Aspects of Scientific Explanation, edited by C. G. Hempel. New York: Free Press.
Week 3. (3/16) Values in Science, 1970-1990
• Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. In The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• McMullin, Ernan. 1983. Values in Science. In Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, edited by P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association.
• [opt] Douglas, H. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Chapters 2-3.
Week 4. (3/23) Semantic Criticism against the Fact/Value Dichotomy
• Putnam, Hilary. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1-2.
• Dupre, John. 2007. Fact and Value. In Kincaid et al. (ed) Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 27-41.
Week 5. (3/30) Knowledge as Social (1)
• Longino, Helen E. 2002. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 2, 4, 6.
Week 6. (4/6) Knowledge as Social (2)
• Longino, H. 1996. Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy. In L. Hankinson Nelson and J. Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, 39-58. Boston: Kluwer.
• Longino, Helen E. 2005. How Values Can Be Good for Science. In Machamer and Wolters (ed.) Science, Values, and Objectivity, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 127-142.
• Intemann, K. 2005. Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science, 72(5), 1001-1012.
• [opt] Longino, Helen E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, Princeton U Press. Chapter 4. “Values and Objectivity”
• [opt] Anderson, E. 2004. Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce. Hypatia, 19: 1-24.
Week 7. (4/13) Challenging the Value-Free Ideal
• Douglas, H. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Chapters 3-4.
• Wilholt, Torsten. 2010. Bias and Values in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40(1): 92-101.
Week 8. (4/20) New conception of objectivity
• Douglas, H. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Chapters 5-6.
• Douglas, H. 2005. Border Skirmishes between Science and Policy. In Machamer and Wolters (ed.) Science, Values, and Objectivity.
Week 9. (4/27) Kitcher and Well-ordered Science
• Kitcher, Philip. 2011. Science in a Democratic Society. Ch. 5: Well-Ordered Science, 105-138. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
• Reiss, J. and Kitcher, P. 2008. Neglected Diseases and Well-Ordered Science. Theoria 66: 263-282.
• Keren, Arnon. 2013. Kitcher on Well-Ordered Science: Should Science Be Measured against the Outcomes of Ideal Democratic Deliberation? Theoria 77: 233-244.
Week 10. (5/4) Values, Epistemic and Non-epistemic
• Mitchell, S. 2005. “The Prescribed and Proscribed values in Science Policy”. In Machamer and Wolters (ed.) Science, Values, and Objectivity.
• Lacey, H. 2005. “Is There a Significant Distinction Between Cognitive and Social Values?” In Machamer and Wolters (ed.) Science, Values, and Objectivity.
• Steel, D. 2010. Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science, 77(1), 14-34.
• [opt] Lacey, H. 2017. Distinguishing between Cognitive and Social Values. In K. Elliott and D. Steel (eds.), Current Controversies in Values and Science, 15-30. New York: Routledge.
• [opt] Rooney, P. 2017. The Borderlands between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values. In K. Elliott and D. Steel (eds.), Current Controversies in Values and Science, 31-45. New York: Routledge.
Week 11. (5/11) Inductive Risk in Climate Science
• Winsberg, Eric. 2012. “Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 22(2): 111-137.
• Parker, Wendy. 2014. “Values and Uncertainties in Climate Prediction, Revisited.” Studies in history and philosophy of science. Part A, 46: 24-30.
• Betz, Gregor. 2013. In Defence of the Value-Free Ideal. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3(2): 207-220.
• [opt] Staley, K. W. 2017. Decisions, Decisions: Inductive Risk and the Higgs Boson. In K. C. Elliott and T. Richards (eds.) Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science, pp. 37-55. New York: Oxford University Press.
Week 12. (5/18) Argument from Inductive Risk, Revisited
• John, S. 2015. Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication. Synthese 192: 79-96.
• de Melo-Martin, I. and Intemann, K. 2016. The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value Free Ideal. Philosophy of Science 83: 500-520.
• Havstad, J. and Brown, M. 2017. ‘Inductive Risk, Deferred Decisions, and Climate Science Advising’. In K. Elliott and T. Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science, 101-23. New York: Oxford University Press.
Week 13. (5/25) The Aims of Research Matter
• Elliott, K., & McKaughn, D. 2014. Non-epistemic values and the multiple goals of science. Philosophy of Science, 81(1), 1-21.
• Intemann, K. 2015. Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5(2), 217-232.
• Steel, D. 2017. ‘Qualified Epistemic Priority: Comparing Two Approaches to Values in Science’. In K. Elliott and D. Steel (eds.), Current Controversies in Values and Science, 49-63. New York: Routledge.
• [opt] Potochnik, A. 2015. The diverse aims of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 53, 71-80.
• [opt] Elliott, K. 2013. Douglas on values: from indirect roles to multiple goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44, 375-383.
Week 14. (6/1) Socially Responsible Science
• Kourany, Janet. 2010. Philosophy of Science after Feminism. Chapter 3-5.
• [opt] Brown, Matthew J. 2013. The Source and Status of Values for Socially Responsible Science. Philosophical Studies, 163(1): 67-76.
• [opt] Lacey, Hugh. 2013. Rehabilitating Neutrality. Philosophical Studies, 163(1): 77-83.
• [opt] Potter, Elizabeth. 2013. Scientific Judgment and Agonistic Pluralism. Philosophical Studies, 163(1): 85-92.
• [opt] Kourany, Janet A. 2013. Meeting the Challenges to Socially Responsible Science: Reply to Brown, Lacey, and Potter. Philosophical Studies, 163(1): 93-103.
Week 15. (6/8) Propsal Presentation (OR, New Arguments for value-free ideal)
• Lacey, Hugh. 2005. On the Interplay of the Cognitive and the Social in Scientific Practices. Philosophy of Science, 72(5): 977-988.
• Hudson, R. 2016. Why We Should Not Reject the Value-Free Ideal of Science. Perspectives on Science, 24(2): 167-191.
• Bright, L. K. 2018. Du Bois’ democratic defence of the value free ideal. Synthese, 195(5): 2227-2245.
(2025.01.29.)
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