[강의계획서] 과학철학연구 (천현득, 2019년 1학기)

- 수업명: <과학철학연구>

- 2019년 1학기

- 서울대 철학과 대학원

- 담당교수: 천현득

■ 수업 개요 및 목표

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- 이번 학기 “과학철학연구” 수업은 마음의 본성과 작동을 탐구하는 “인지과학의 철학”을 주제로 한다. 인지과학은 사고, 지각, 행동 등에 관한 학제적인 연구 분야로서, 심리학, 인공지능, 언어학, 신경과학, 그리고 철학 등 다양한 분야의 연구에 의존한다. 따라서 마음의 본성을 해명하려는 철학의 오래된 관심은 현대 인지과학과 많은 영향을 주고받는다. 우리는 인지과학에서 제기되는 주된 철학적 쟁점들 가운데 일부를 선별하여 다룰 것이다. 인지과학의 철학적 측면에 관심이 있거나, 과학철학의 일반적 쟁점들이 인지과학이라는 영역에 어떻게 적용되는지 관심이 있거나, 마음의 본성을 이해하기 위해 과학과 철학의 경계를 기꺼이 넘으려는 사람에게 유익한 수업이 될 것이다.

- 수업에서 다룰 주제들은 다음과 같다. 마음은 컴퓨터인가? 마음은 범용 기제인가 아니면 전문화된 특수 기제들의 집합인가? 우리의 사고는 세계를 어떻게 표상하는가? 마음은 확장되고 체화되어 있는가?

■ 참고문헌

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주교재는 없고, 필요한 문헌들은 게시판 등을 통해 배부한다. 아래는 참고문헌들이다.

• Berdumez, J. L. (2010), Cognitive Science. Cambridge.

• Cain, M. J. (2016), The Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Polity Press.

• Clark, A. (2014), Mindware (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press.

• Cummins, R. & Cummins D. D. (Eds.) (2000), Minds, Brains, and Computers. Blackwell.

• Dawson, M.R.W. (1998), Understanding Cognitive Science. Blackwell.

• Haugeland, J. (ed) (1997), Mind Design II. MIT Press.,

• Frankish & Ramsey, The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, Cambridge University Press.

• Stainton, R. (2006), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell.

• Prinz, J. (2002), Furnishing the Mind, The MIT Press.

■ 성적 평가: 참여도, 발제 및 비평문, 기말논문

• 1) 모든 수강생은 매 수업에 성실하게 참여할 것이 요구된다. 주어진 문헌을 미리 읽어오고 수업 중 토론에 참여한다.

• 2) 한 학기에 1회 이상 발제를 담당한다. 발제자는 해당 주에 읽어야할 모든 필수 문헌을 대상으로 하여, 핵심 내용을 (논증적으로 재구성하는 방식으로) 요약하고, 함께 토론할만한 주제를 소개한다. 발제문은 수업시간 24시간 전에 제출한다. (게시판 이용)

• 3) 한 학기에 2-3회 논평문을 제출한다. 논평은 하나의 문헌(혹은 한 묶음)을 중심으로, 핵심 논증에 대한 자기 나름의 재구성, 주요 주장에 대한 가능한 반론, 숨겨진 전제, 저자가 제시하지 않은 지지 논증, 저자의 주장이 가진 추가적인 함의 등을 포함할 수 있다. 분량은 2매를 넘지 않도록 하며, 수업시간 24시간 전까지 제출한다.

• 4) 기말논문은 6월 18일까지 제출하고, 기한 내 제출된 논문은 간략한 논평과 함께 반환한다. 기한을 넘겨 제출하는 경우 늦은 만큼 감점될 수 있고 논평을 받지 못할 수 있다.

■ Schedule and Readings

Week 1. (3/6) Philosophy of Cognitive Science?

• Cain, M. J. (2016), The Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Polity Press. Chapter 1.

• Abramsen and Bechtel. 2012. “History and core themes.” In Frankish & Ramsey (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, Cambridge University Press.

• [opt] Thagard, P. (2018), “Cognitive Science”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

• [opt] Haugeland, J. (1978), “The nature and plausibility of cognitivism”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1: 215-26.

Part I. General Issuses in Cognitive Science

Week 2. (3/13) Classical Computationalism and Connectionism

• Haugeland, J. “Semantic Engines”, Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design (First Edition, MIT, 1981); Reprinted in Cummins and Cummins (eds.), Minds, Brains and Computers. Blackwell.

• Block, N. (1995), “The mind as the software of the brain.” In E. E. Smith & D. N. Osherson (Eds.), Thinking: An Invitation to the Cognitive Science (pp. 377-425). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

• Rumelhart, D. E. (1989), “The architecture of mind: A connectionist approach.” In M. I. Posner (ed.), 1989, Foundations of Cognitive Science.; Reprinted in Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design II (MIT, 1997)

Week 3. (3/20) The Alternative Approaches

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• Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988), “Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis.” Cognition 28: 3-71.; Reprinted in Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design II (MIT, 1997)

• Smolensky, P. (1988), “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11(1): 1-23.

• Van Gelder, T. (1992), “What might cognition be, if not computation”, Journal of Philosophy 92: 345-381.

Week 4. (3/27) Explanation in Cognitive Science

• Fodor, J. (1968), “The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 627-640.; Reprinted in J. A. Fodor, 1981, Representations.

• [opt] Marr, D. (1982), Vision. Freeman. [Section 1], Reprinted in Cummins and Cummins

• Clark. A. (1990), “Connectionism, competence and explanation.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 195-222.

• Piccinini, G. & Craver, C. (2011), “Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional analyses as mechanism sketches.” Synthese 183: 283-311.

Week 5. (4/3) Reduction and Multiple realization

• Fodor, J. (1974), “Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)”, Synthese 28: 97-115.

• Shapiro, L. (2000), “Multiple realizations”, Journal of Philosophy 97(12): 635-654.

• Bechtel, W. and J. Mundale (1999), “Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states”, Philosophy of Science 66(2): 175-207.

• [opt] Aizawa, K. (2009), “Neuroscience and multiple realization: A reply to Bechtel and Mundale”, Synthese 167(3): 493-510.

Part II. Modularity of Mind

Week 6. (4/10) Modularity and Fodor-Churchland debate

• Fodor, J. (1983), Modularity of Mind. MIT Press, Chapter 1

• [opt] Fodor, J. (1985), “Precis of Modularity of Mind”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 1-42.

• Churchland, P. (1988). “Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.” Philosophy of Science 55: 167-87.

• Fodor, J. (1988). “A reply to Churchland’s ‘perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality’.” Philosophy of Science 55: 188-98.

Week 7. (4/17) Cognitive Penetrability

• Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1999), “Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 341-365.

• MacPherson, F. (2012), “Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84: 24-62.

• Stokes, D. (2012), “Perceiving and desiring: a new look at the cognitive penetrability of experience.” Philosophical Studies 158: 477-492.

• [opt] McCauley, R. N. and Henrich, J. (2006), “Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system.” Philosophical Psychology, 19: 79–101.

Week 8. (4/24) Massive Modularity: For or Against

• Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds.) (1994), Mapping the Mind, Cambridge Unversity Press, Introduction.

• [opt] Barrett, H. C. and Kurzban, R. (2006), “Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.” Psychological Review, 113, 628-647.

• Carruthers, P. (2006), “The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind”, in Stainton (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell.

• Samules, R. (2006), “Is the Human Mind Massively Modular?”, in Stainton (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell.

Week 9. (5/1) Mind: Modular and Flexible?

• Fodor, J. (2000), The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, The MIT Press, Chapter 4.

• Carruthers, P. (2006), The Architecture of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 4.

• Sperber, D. (2005), “Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive?” In The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, (eds.), Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen P. Stich (eds.), 53–68. New York: Oxford University Press.

• [opt] Frankenhuis, Willem & Ploeger, Annemie (2007), “Evolutionary psychology versus Fodor: Arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis.” Philosophical Psychology 20, 687–710.

Part III. What Concepts are

Week 10. (5/8) What Concepts Are

• Fodor, J. (1998), Concepts, Oxford University Press, Chapter 2.

• Prinz, J. (2002), Furnishing the Mind, MIT Press, Chapter 1-2.

• Rosch, E. 1978. “Principles of Categorization”. In E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Eds.) Cognition and Categorization, pp. 27-48. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.; Reprinted in Laurence and Margolis (eds.), Concepts (MIT, 1999)

• [opt] S. Laurence and E. Margolis, “Concepts and Cognitive Science”, in their Concepts: Core Readings (MIT, 1999).

Week 11. (5/15) Concepts: Prototypes, Exemplars, and Theories

• Prinz, J. (2002), Furnishing the Mind, MIT Press, Chapter 3.

• Fodor, J. (1998), Concepts, Oxford University Press, Chapter 5.

• Prinz, J. (2002), Section 4.1

• Murphy & Medin (1985), “The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence”, Psychological Review 92(3): 289-316.

• [opt] Rehder, B. (2003), “A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29, 1141-1159.

Week 12. (5/22) Concept Nativism

• Prinz, J. (2002), Section 4.2.

• Machery, E. (2010), “Precis of Doing Without Concepts”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 195-206.

• [opt] Keil, F. et al. (1998), “Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge”, Cognition 65: 103–135.

• [opt] Weiskopf, D. (2009), “The plurality of concepts”, Synthese 169: 145-173.

Week 13. (5/29) Concepts: recent debate

• Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998), “The extended mind,” Analysis 78: 7-19.

• Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. (2001), “The bounds of cognition”. Philosophical Psychology 14: 43-64.

• Rupert, R. (2004), “Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition,” Journal of philosophy 101: 389-428.

• [opt] Sprevak, M. (2009), “Extended Cognition and Functionalism,” Journal of philosophy 106: 503-27.

Week 14. (6/5) General Discussion

Week 15. (6/12) Proposal Presentation

(2019.07.26.)