- 과목명: <인식론 연습: 현대인식론>
- 서울대 철학과 대학원
- 2019년 1학기
- 담당 교수: 김기현
■ 강의 내용
이 수업은 현대인식론의 쟁점들을 논의한다.
김기현, 『현대인식론』 (민음사, 1998)와 Steup, Turri, Sosa (eds.)(2008), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology에서 다루어진 쟁점들을 논의함으로써 현대인식론의 핵심 주제들을 이해하는 것을 목적으로 한다.
■ 과제 및 성적평가
수업을 위하여 각 참석자는 배당된 논문을 반드시 읽고 수업에 참가하여야 한다. 학기 말에 주제를 선정하여 기말리포트를 제출하여야 한다.
■ 필독 도서
• 김기현, 『현대인식론』 (민음사, 1998)
• Steup, Turri, Sosa (eds.)(2008), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edition, Wiley Blackwell (중앙도서관 on-line)
■ 참고 논문집
(1) Marshall Swain and George Pappas (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978)
(2) Paul Moser (ed.), Empirical Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986)
(3) Paul Moser and Arnold Vander Net (eds.), Human knowledge (NY: Oxford University press, 1987)
(4) Steup and Sosa (eds.)(2007), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Massachusetts: Blackwell)
■ 추천 논문 또는 저서들
• Armstrong (1973), Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press): 162-175.
• BonJour (1986), The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986): 2장과 5장.
• Cohen (1998), “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76.
• DeRose (1995), “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Phil. Review
• DeRose (2010), “Insensitivity is Back, Baby”, Philosophical Perspectives 24: 161-187.
• Dretske (1970), “Epistemic Operators,” The Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007-1023.
• Dretske (1971), “Conclusive Reasons,” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 1-22. in (1)
• Dretske (2007), “The Case against Closure” in (4).
• Feldman and Conee (1985), “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48. in (3)
• Gettier (1963), “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Analysis 23: 121-123. in (2), (3)
• Goldman (1967), “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 355-372. in (1)
• Goldman (1979), “What is Justified Belief?,” in (2)
• Harman (1986), Change in View (Cambridge: MIT Press): 4장.
• Hawthorne (2007), “The Case for Closure” in (4)
• Nozick (1981), Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press), chapter 3: 172-85.
• Pryor (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous 34: 517-549.
• Pryor (2007), “There is Immediate Justification,” in (4).
• Schiffer (1996), “Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society
• Sosa (1980), “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in French et al eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5 Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press): 3-25. in (2), (3)
• Williams (2007), “Doing without Immediate Justification.” in (4).
■ 다룰 주제들의 예시
(쟁점 1) 인식 정당성의 문제
• 『현대인식론』 6장
• Sosa (1980), “The Raft and the Pyramid” in (2), (3)
• BonJour (1986), The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986): 2장과 5장
• Pryor (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous 34: 517-549.
• Pryor (2007), “There is Immediate Justification,” in (4)
• Williams (2007), “Doing without Immediate Justification” in (4)
• Goldman (1979), “What is Justified Belief?” in (2)
• Feldman and Conee (1985), “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies 48. in (3)
(쟁점 2) 회의론
• 『현대인식론』 3장, 7장
• Armstrong, D. M. (1973), Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press): 162-175.
• Nozick (1981), Philosophical Explanations, 172-185, 197-221.
• Dretske (1970), “Epistemic Operators,” The Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007-1023.
• Dretske (1971), “Conclusive Reasons” in (1)
• Dretske (2007), “The Case against Closure” in (3)
• Hawthorne (2007), “The Case for Closure” in (3)
• Davies, M., (1998), “Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant”, in C. Wright, B.C Smith and C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 321-61.
• Wright, C. “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof,” in Philosophical Issues. 1998. (SOFIA volume)
• Brown, J. Chapter 7 in Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Combridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.
• Pryor. “Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning.” (PDF)
(쟁점 3) 맥락주의, Sensitivity
• DeRose (1995), “Solving the Skeptical Problem”
• DeRose (2010), “Insensitivity is Back, Baby,” Philosophical Perspectives 24: 161-187.
• Cohen (1998), “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76.
• Schiffer (1996), “Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism”, Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 96, 317-333.
• J. Hawthorne and J. Stanley (2008), “Knowledge and Action”, Journal of Philosophy, 105(10): 571-590.
• John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, Chapter 1 and 4.
• Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, Chapter 5, Conclusion.
(쟁점 4) 자기지식과 외재주의
• Gertler, “Self-Knowledge”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)
• T. Parent, “Externalism and Self-Knowledge”, in SEP.
• Boghossian, “Content and self-knowledge”, in Ludlow and Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. (ES)
• Boghossian, “What the externalist can know a priori”, in Wright, Smith and McDonald (eds.), Knowing our Own Minds. (KOM)
• McLaughlin and Tye, “Externalism, Twin Earth, and self-knowledge” in KOM.
• Dretske, “Externalism and self-knowledge”; Davidson, “Knowing one’s own mind” in ES.
• Burge, “Individualism and self-knowledge” in ES.
(쟁점 5) 의견불일치
• Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”
• Elga, Adam, “Reflection and Disagreement” Nous 41 (2007): 478-502.
• Christensen, David, “Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News”, Phil. Review (2007): 187-217.
• Kelly, Thomas, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, in Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
• Kelly, Thomas, “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence”, in Feldman and Warfield (eds.), Disagreement (2010).
(2024.11.02.)
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