- 주제: 양상성과 본질
- 기간: 2014.04.14. ~ 2014.06.30.
- 담당교수: 한성일
1. Introduction to Essentialism
(1) Della Rocca, M., 1996a, “Essentialism Part 1”, Philosophical Books, 37: 1-13.
(2) Della Rocca, M., 1996b, “Essentialism Part 2”, Philosophical Books, 37: 81-89.
(3) Yablo, S., 1998, “Essentialism”, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London Routledge, 417-422.
2. Two Notions of Essential Property The Modal Account and the Finean Account
(1) Fine, Kit. 1994a. ‘Essence and Modality.’ Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16.
(2) Fine, Kit. 1994b. “Ontological Dependence”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 269-90.
(3) Fine, Kit. 2005. “Necessity and Non-Existence”, in his Modality and Tense, Oxford University Press.
(4) Correia, F. 2007. “Finean Essence and Priorean Modality”, Dialectica.
(5) Robertson, Teresa. ‘Essential vs. Accidental Properties.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/essential-accidental/>.
(6) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’ Philosophy Compass, 6/1 (2011) 65–77. Sections 1-2.
3. Essentialist Principles (I): Three Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin
(1) Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III.
(2) Mackie, Penelope. ‘Identity, Time and Necessity.’ Proceedings for the Aristotelian Society 98 (1998): 59-78.
(3) Rohbraugh, Guy and deRosset, Louis. ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin.’ Mind 133 (2004): 705-25.
(4) Hawthorne, J. and T. Gendler, 2000 “Origin Essentialism The Arguments Reconsidered”, Mind, 109: 285-298.
(5) McGinn, C., 1976, “On the Necessity of Origin”, The Journal of Philosophy, 73: 127-35.
(6) Mackie, P., 1987, “Essence, Origin, and Bare Identity”, Mind, 96: 173-201.
4. Essentialist Principles (II): Essentiality of Kind
(1) Brody, Baruch. ‘Natural Kinds and Real Essences.’ Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 431-46.
(2) Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapters 7 and 8.
(3) Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Chapter 3.
5. Essentialist Principles (III): Natural Kind Essentialism
(1) Kripke, Saul. ‘Identity and Necessity.’ Identity and Individuation, Ed. M. K. Munitz. New York: New York University Press, 1971. 135-64.
(2) Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA Harvard UP, 1972/1980. Lecture III.
(3) Putnam, Hilary. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”.’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 215-71.
6. Sufficient-for-Existence Properties (and Cross-World Identification Principles)
(1) Chisholm, Roderick. ‘Identity through Possible Worlds Some Questions.’ Noûs 1.1 (1967) 1-8.
(2) Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been Individuals, Kinds and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Chapter 3.
(3) Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton UP, 1981. Chapter 7.
7. Individual Essences and Counterparts
(1) Mackie, Penelope. ‘Transworld Identity.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/identity-transworld/>. Section 4.
(2) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.’ Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 65–77. Sections 3-4.
(3) Coburn, R., 1986, “Individual Essences and Possible Worlds”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein 1986, 165-83.
(4) Kaplan, D., 1979, “Transworld Heir Lines”, in The Possible and the Actual Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, M. Loux (ed.), Ithaca Cornell University Press, 88-109.
(5) Lewis, D., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds.
(6) Lewis, D., “Counterparts of persons and Their Bodies”.
(7) Lewis, D., “Survival and Identity with Postscripts”
(8) Stalnaker, R., 1986, “Counterparts and Identity”, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein, 1986, 121-40.
(9) Fara, M., and Williamson, T., 2005, “Counterparts and Actuality”, Mind, 114: 1-30.
8. Essentiality and Conceivability
(1) Yablo, S., 1987, “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 293-314.
(2) Yablo, S., 1993. “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 1-42.
(3) Della Rocca, M., 1996c, “Essentialists and Essentialism”, Journal of Philosophy, 93: 186-202.
(4) 선우환, 2002, 「통세계적 동일성의 문제와 양상 인식론」
9. Modal Logic and Modal Semantics
(1) Kripke, S. 1963. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16.
(2) Forbes, G. 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford Oxford University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
10. Flexible Essential Properties and S4
(1) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’ Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011) 54-64. Section 3.
(2) Salmon, Nathan. Reference and Essence. Princeton UP, 1981. Appendix 1.
11. Individual Essences and Possibilia
(1) Peacocke, Christopher. ‘Principles for Possibilia.’ Noûs 36.3 (2002): 486-508.
(2) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’ Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 54-64. Section 2.
12. Necessitism and Essentialism A Third Notion of Essential Property
(1) Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward. ‘In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.’ Philosophical Studies 84 (1996): 283-94.
(2) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’ Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011) 54-64. Section 5.
(3) Williamson, Timothy. ‘Bare Possibilia.’ Erkenntnis 48 (1998): 257-73.
13. Essentialism and Modal Logic The Barcan Formula
(1) Menzel, Christopher. ‘Actualism.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). Ed. Edward N. Zalta.
URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/actualism/>. Section 2.
(2) Roca-Royes, Sonia. ‘Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism.’ Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011) 54-64. Section 4.
(2015.07.04.)
