- 수업명: <과학철학통론1>
- 2019년 1학기
- 서울대 과학사 및 과학철학 협동과정 대학원
- 담당교수: 천현득
■ 수업 목표 및 개요
- 이 수업은 현대과학철학의 핵심 주제 가운데 과학적 설명, 과학 이론, 과학적 방법을 다룬다. 각 주제에 관한 전통적인 견해들을 소개하고 비판적으로 고찰함으로써, 수강생은 과학철학 논의에서 등장하는 개념, 이론, 논증 방식을 익히고 전문적인 연구를 수행할 수 있는 기초 능력을 얻는다.
- 담담교수가 전반적인 배경정보를 제공하기 위해 일부 강의를 하고, 수강생들이 발제하고 함께 토론한다.
- 기초문헌: 과학철학에 대한 사전지식이 없는 경우, 개강 이전에 아래의 문헌 가운데 둘 이상을 읽어야 한다.
• 1) 신광복, 천현득, 『과학이란 무엇인가』, 서울: 생각의힘.
• 2) Chalmers, A. (신중섭, 이상원 옮김), 『과학이란 무엇인가』, 서울: 서광사
• 3) 장하석, 『장하석의 과학, 철학을 만나다』, 지식플러스.
• 4) 장대익, 『쿤과 포퍼: 과학에는 뭔가 특별한 게 있다』, 김영사.
■ 교재 및 참고문헌
- 주교재는 스스로 준비해야하며, 나머지 문헌들은 게시판 등을 통해 배부한다.
• [Main Text] Curd, M., A. Cover, and C. Pincock (eds.)(2013), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (2nd Edition), Norton. [CCP]
• Brody, B., and R. Grandy (eds.) (1989), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (2nd ed.), Prentice Hall.
• Pitt, J. (ed.) (1988), Theories of Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hempel, C. G. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
• Hempel, C. G. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Press.
• Kuhn, T. S. (1962/1996), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
■ 성적 평가: 출석 및 참여도, 발제, 기말시험, 기말논문
- 1) 모든 수강생은 매 수업에 성실하게 참여할 것이 요구된다. 주어진 문헌을 미리 읽어오고 수업 중 토론에 참여한다.
- 2) 서로 다른 주제에 관해 3회 이상 발표하는 것을 기본으로 하되, 발표 횟수는 수강생 수에 따라 조정될 수 있다. 발표문은 다섯 쪽 이내로 작성하며, 핵심 내용을 논증적으로 재구성한 후 이를 비판적으로 검토하는 논평문의 형태여야 한다. 발표문은 수업 24시간 전에 eTL 게시판에 올린다. (각 발표자는 25분의 발표 시간을 가지고 이후 25분의 토론 시간을 가지는 것을 원칙으로 하되, 발표 및 토론 시간은 수업의 진행에 따라 조정될 수 있다.)
- 3) 기말시험은 6월 11일(월) 수업시간에 치른다. 수업시간에 다룬 모든 내용을 대상으로 한다.
- 4) 기말논문은 6월 18일(화) 자정까지 제출하고, 기한 내 제출된 논문은 간략한 논평과 함께 반환한다. 기한을 넘겨 제출하는 경우, 늦은 만큼 감점되고 논평을 받지 못할 수 있다.
- 기말논문 작성 시 확인사항:
• (1) 논문에서 다루려는 철학적 문제를 세부적이고 분명인가?
• (2) 핵심 주장과 논제는 분명히 진술되었는가?
• (3) 그를 뒷받침할 논증은 상세히 서술되었는가? (사례를 사용했다면, 단순하면서도 생생한 사례인가?)
• (4) 논증에 대한 가능한 반론들을 고려했는가?
• (5) 불필요한 전문용어(jargon)나 불분명한 어휘들이 사용되지 않았는가?
• (6) 퇴고 과정은 거쳤는가?
■ Schedule and Readings
※ 아래 일정은 잠정적이며, 각 주의 읽기 자료도 변경될 수 있다.
[†]을 제외한 문헌은 모두 필독 문헌이고, [*] 표시가 있는 문헌이 발제 대상 문헌이다.
Week 1 (3/4) Introduction with syllabus
Part I. Scientfiic Explanation
Week 2 (3/11) Scientific Explanation: The Hempelian Approach
• Hempel, C. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science, Chapter 5.
• Carnap, R. (1966), “The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction”, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, New York: Basic Books, (pp. 12-16); reprinted in [CCP, 651-656]
• Hempel, C. and P. Oppenhiem (1948), “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 15(2): 135-175. (esp., Section 1, 2, 3 and 6); reprinted in Brody & Grandy, pp.151-155 & 160-163.
• Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 359-376.
• [*] Scriven, M. (1962), “Explanation, Predictions, and Laws”; reprinted in Pitt (ed.), Theories of Explanation, pp. 67-72.
• [*] Hempel, C. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 381-383, & 394-403.
Week 3 (3/18) Statistical Models
• Salmon, W. (1971), “Statistical Explanation”, in W. Salmon (ed.), Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, pp. 29-87.
• [*] Railton, P. (1978), “A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 45: 206-226.; reprinted in [CCP, 691-710]
• [*] Salmon, W. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Chapter 5 and 6; reprinted in Pitt (ed.), “Statistical Explanation and Causality,” pp.79-118.
• [†] Kitcher, P. (1989), “Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure”, in P. Kitcher & W. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. ⅩⅢ, pp. 430-505 (especially pp.459-475).
Week 4 (3/25) Pragmatic Models and …
• Friedman, M. (1974), “Explanation and Scientific Understanding,” Journal of Philosophy 71: 5-19.; reprinted in Pitt (ed), pp.188-198.
• [*] van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image, chapter 5. (esp., from § 2.7); reprinted in Pitt (ed), Theories of Explanation, pp. 136-155.
• [*] Kitcher, P. and W. Salmon (1987), “Van Fraassen on Explanation”, Journal of Philosophy 84: 315-330.
• Achinstein, P. (1983), The Nature of Explanation, pp.157-164, 181-185.
• [*] Cartwright, N. (1980), “The Truth Doesn't Explain Much,” in Brody & Grandy, pp.184-189.
• [†] De Regt, H. W. and D. Dieks (2005), “A contextual approach to scientific understanding,” Synthese 144: 137-170. (esp., section 4)
Week 5 (4/1) The Causal-Mechanical Models
• [*] Salmon, W. (1994), “Causality without Counterfactuals”, Philosophy of Science 61: 297-312.
• [*] Hitchcock, C. (1995), “Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance”, Philosophy of Science 62: 304-320.
• [*] Woodward, J. (2003), “The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation,” [CCP, 735-753]
• [†] Salmon, W. (1997), “Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques”, Philosophy of Science 64: 461-477.
Part II. Scientific Theories
Week 6 (4/8) Scientific Theories: The (Once) Received View
• Hempel, C. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science, Chapter 6.
• Carnap, R., “Theories as Partially Interpreted Formal System”, in Brody & Grady, pp.5-12.
• [*] Hempel, C. (1970), “On the ‘Standard Conception’ of Scientific Theories”, in Radner & Winokur (eds.) (1970), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ⅳ pp.142-163.
• [†] Hempel, C. G. (1965). “The theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction”. Chapter 8 of Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 173-228). Free Press.
• [*] Suppe, F., The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp.16-36, 45-53.
Week 7 (4/15) Criticism to The Received View
• Putnam, H., “What theories are not”, in Mathematics, Matter and Method, pp.215-220.
• Achinstein, P., Concepts of Science, pp.157-165 & 172-178.
• [*] Suppe, F. (1972), “What’s wrong with the received view on the structure of scientific theories?”, Philosophy of Science 39, 1-19.
• [†] Beatty, J. (1980), “What's wrong with the received view of evolutionary theory?”, PSA 1980, vol. 2, pp.397-426.
• [*] Giere, R. (1988), Explaning Science, Ch. 3, “Models and Theories”, University of Chicago Press. pp. 62-91.
• [†] Churchland, Paul (1989), “On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective”, in Paul Churchland (1989), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, MIT, pp.153-196.
Week 8 (4/22) Alternative approaches
• [*] Morgan, M. and M. Morrison (1999), “Models as Mediating Instruments.” In their Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• [†] Suárez, M. and N. Cartwright (2008), “Theories: Tools versus Models,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39: 62-81.
• Craver, C. “Structures of Scientific Theories,” in Machamer (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 55-79.
• [*] Machamer, P., Darden, L., and C. Craver (2000). “Thinking about mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67: 1-25.
Part III. Scientific Method
Week 9 (4/29) The Method of Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis
(1) Some Historical Backgrounds
• Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (trans. J. Cottingham et al), pp. 143-144 & 240-245.
• Newton, I., Newton’s Philosophy of Nature (ed. H. S. Thayer), pp. 3-8.
(2) Confirmation
• [*] Braithwaite, R., Scientific Explanation, pp. 12-21.
• Hempel, C. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science, Chs. 2-3.
• [*] Hempel, C. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science, Chapter 4.; reprinted in [CCP, 424-438]
• Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, (pp.3-20.)
Week 10 (5/6) Survey for the term paper.
Week 11 (5/13) The Method of Confirmation and of Falsification
• Popper, K., Logic of Scientific Discovery, Chs. 1, 2, 4, & 5.
• [*] Popper, K. (1963). “Science: Conjectures and Refutations.” In Conjectures and Refutations (pp. 33-59). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Glymour, C. (1980), Theory and Evidence, Princeton Univ. Press, pp. 29-48.
• [*] Achinstein, P. (2000), “Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored”, Philosophy of Science 67, Supplement, pp. S180-S192.
Week 12 (5/20) The Logic of Discovery
• [*] Hanson, N., “Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?”, in Brody and Grandy, pp. 398-408.
• Suppe, P., The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 151-166.
• Harman, G., “The Inference to the Best Explanation”, Philosophical Review, 74, 88-95; Reprinted in Brody & Grandy, pp.323-327.
• [*] Curd, M., “The Logic of Discovery: An Analysis of Three Approaches”, in Brody & Grandy, pp. 417-427.
• [opt] Langley, P., et al (1987), Scientific Discovery, pp. 44-62.
Week 13 (5/27) Historical Approaches
• Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chs. 2-4, 9, 10, 12 & Postscript.
• [*] Kuhn, T., “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice”, Reprinted in [CCP]
• [*] Lakatos, I., “History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions”
• Suppe, F., The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 135-151.
• [opt] McMullin, E., “Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science”, Reprinted in [CCP]
Week 14 (6/3) History, Objectivity and Values
• Feyerabend, P., Against Method, excerpts
• Feyerabend, P. (1975) “How to Defend Society Against Science?”, Radical Philosophy 11 (1): 3-9.
• Suppe, F., The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 170-180.
• [*] Longino, H., “Values and Objectivity”; Reprinted in [CCP]
• [*] Okruhlik, K., “Gender and the Biological Sciences”, Reprinted in [CCP]
Week 15 (6/11) Final Exam.
(2019.10.01.)
